Liverpool are removed from the well-oiled machine they have been at instances in Arne Slot‘s first season in cost and one of many predominant causes for concern is the best way they press – or don’t press.
Three defeats on the bounce going into a global break might be the worst factor a coach at a high membership can ask for.
The additional time to dwell on the problems can exaggerate them, however it might probably additionally supply time to work on fixing them – at the least in principle, as many gamers are away with their nationwide groups.
These defeats have led to questions being requested round Liverpool’s comparatively stodgy begin to the season, regardless of the staff nonetheless sitting second within the league desk.
Together with a number of teething issues in assault, maybe extra pertinent are the noticeable points with urgent and out-of-possession work.
Why urgent is such a giant difficulty
Although it’s too early within the season to return to too many conclusions, issues with urgent and off-the-ball form and decision-making may cause issues in assault in addition to defence, and can want addressing quickly.
There was a second in Liverpool’s sport towards Chelsea when Dominik Szoboszlai closed down three or 4 consecutive opposition gamers as they handed the ball throughout the again line.
As soon as he pressed the ultimate participant within the chain of passes, to no avail, he rotated and gestured as if to say ‘the place is the help?’.
This sort of lone closing down can increase questions on a staff’s total urgent system. Generally gamers will take it upon themselves to make use of a burst of power to shut down a number of gamers consecutively in a part of play.
It isn’t essentially an issue in isolation, and typically it’s a urgent set off in itself. One specific Andy Robertson instance beneath Jurgen Klopp sticks within the thoughts, whereas Luis Suarez used to do that often.

A correctly organised urgent system shouldn’t depend on one participant to shut down a number of opponents too usually. It can as an alternative use the power extra economically by having a number of gamers closing down completely different areas.
This off-ball teamwork, and all gamers working as a coordinated unit, is when ‘closing down’ turns into ‘urgent’.
It’s secure to say Szoboszlai’s lone press didn’t work, and there have been echoes of Suarez’s common appeals to his team-mates to help him in one thing extra proactive.
The numbers


Final season Liverpool’s urgent was – maybe unsurprisingly within the post-Klopp period – barely down on earlier years, but it surely was typically nonetheless efficient when deployed.
This season there’s a feeling that each the numbers are down and that the urgent is extra usually ineffective.
Groups look like getting by way of Liverpool’s defensive construction earlier and are discovering it simpler (not essentially straightforward) to play over or across the press.
It’s not at all times helpful to have a look at numbers after simply seven league video games in a season and it’s not price reaching too many conclusions from them, however for what it’s price they do present Liverpool’s urgent has dropped off, having already dropped off final season compared to the Klopp period.


Possession gained within the ultimate third is down from 4.5 instances per 90 final season to three.9 this season.
Their opponents’ price of passes per defensive motion is up (indicating much less urgent) from 8.9 to 9.4 per Understat, and pressed sequences (outlined right here) are down from 12.6 final season to 10.4 this season per Opta.
That is all depending on opposition, and also you don’t actually get correct tendencies till extra video games are performed.
A few of this drop in urgent might be defined by Liverpool dealing with a number of low blocks up to now. After they have extra of the ball they naturally should win it again much less usually.
This could counsel much less defensive work for the centre-backs, however in actual fact their defensive numbers are up in each circumstances.


Final season, Virgil van Dijk averaged 8.1 defensive actions per 90. This season up to now, he’s on 11.3 defensive actions per 90. Ibrahima Konate averaged 6.9 in 2024/25 and eight.6 up to now in 2025/26.
The central defenders are doing extra, not much less, whereas the urgent numbers additional up the pitch are decrease.
When mixed, this implies that the defending from the entrance is much less frequent, much less efficient, or a mixture of the 2.
Additional Opta information (by way of Cannon Stats) reveals Liverpool are averaging their defensive actions the eighth-closest to their very own aim of any Premier League aspect this season.
Briefly, much less efficient urgent is resulting in extra defensive actions being carried out in deeper areas.
New signings


Coordination, timing and positioning are such a giant a part of an efficient defensive setup, it’s no shock that Liverpool have dropped off on this space.
New signings not solely want time to get used to their team-mates in assault, however in addition they want time to get used to a defensive system.
They’re additionally, in some circumstances, completely different profiles to the gamers they’re changing, particularly on the subject of these main the road.
It’s a giant take a look at of Slot and his coaches in that they’re now instructing new gamers their very own methods from scratch.
With Florian Wirtz, Milos Kerkez, Jeremie Frimpong, Hugo Ekitike and Alexander Isak, there aren’t any good urgent habits hanging over from the Klopp period. No bedding-in interval.


Through the Klopp period, gamers would usually take weeks and even months to get used to his defensive system.
Fabinho grew to become top-of-the-line gamers on the planet in his place and was a key a part of the titles gained beneath Klopp, however took months to adapt.
Initially, Klopp raised considerations about Fabinho’s adaptation from enjoying in his extra acquainted function in a two-man midfield in entrance of the defence in a 4-2-3-1 (a job which might be known as a double six, because it was by Klopp, or a double pivot), to changing into the one defensive midfielder in a 4-3-3 (a single pivot in a 4-1-2-3).
Following efficiency towards Pink Star Belgrade within the Champions League in October 2018, Klopp commented that the 4-2-3-1 system utilized in that sport – a diversion from his typical 4-3-3 – suited Fabinho, who was additionally celebrating his birthday on that day.
“The current for his birthday was not that he was within the beginning lineup, it was that we performed his favorite system with a double six,” Klopp mentioned, describing Fabinho’s efficiency as “excellent, very, excellent.”


Fabinho was afforded time, as have been gamers like Robertson, who was backup for a while earlier than making the left-back spot his personal.
One of many causes a few of Liverpool’s new signings beneath Klopp took weeks and months to adapt was not that they couldn’t match into the assault, however as a result of they have been nonetheless not used to how Liverpool pressed as a staff out of possession.
They needed to study when to press and when to carry, what opposition actions set off the press, which areas they need to be protecting and when is the proper time to spring ahead from these areas in an aggressive press.


This adaptation to out-of-possession play might be an even bigger cause for Liverpool’s stodgy begin to 2025/26 than any points in assault, particularly when off-the-ball work has at all times been a giant driver of the assault.
In spite of everything, counter-pressing is your greatest creator, as Klopp as soon as mentioned.
To convey this again into the context of the introduction of Liverpool’s new signings in 2025, Fabinho arrived that summer season for the not-insignificant sum of £39 million, however that Champions League sport towards Pink Star in October was solely his second begin.
Robertson solely began two league video games in his first 4 months on the membership.


The newest group of signings beneath Slot haven’t had the luxurious of such a bedding-in interval. In preferrred circumstances, a few of Wirtz, Kerkez, Isak, Ekitike and Frimpong could be granted an identical adaptation time, however for varied causes they gained’t be.
These causes vary from the cheap expectation that £100 million-plus gamers comparable to Wirtz and Isak ought to slot straight in, to the truth that rapid upgrades have been wanted at full-back and these gamers wanted to begin immediately.
Such concerns are on the membership, not the gamers themselves, and counsel Liverpool enacted an excessive amount of of their rebuild in a single go.
Disaster speak


None of this constitutes a disaster, as sure media reactions – and articles like this one – would possibly counsel, however it’s at the least one thing to consider and an issue to resolve.
Even after they have been profitable video games earlier within the season Liverpool weren’t firing on all cylinders, and this has solely been highlighted additional for the reason that run of three defeats.
It’s higher to be second within the desk and have a transparent concept of which areas want enchancment, as is the case with Liverpool, than it’s to be mid-table and uncertain of what the issues are or which could want addressing first, which is the case for another groups.
Liverpool’s points revolve principally round their near-unprecedented first-team overhaul and gamers getting used to one another and their new coach’s strategies.
And this adaptation applies to off-the-ball coordination as a lot as, and certain greater than, it does for creating relationships in possession.

















